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Critical Thinking in Applied Psychology: Toward an Edifying View of Critical Thinking in Applied Psychology
Steve Yanchar, Aaron Jackson, Kristin Hansen, and Jamie Hansen

A gospel-centered approach to critical thinking that can facilitate psychotherapeutic work and be edifying to faithful
counselors and clients would be very beneficial. This article examines what a defensible approach to gospel-centered
critical thinking about psychotherapy would look like, how it would differ from secular scholarly disciplines and
practices, and whether it should differ at all. Because all critical thinking strategies are framed by a theoretical
background of assumptions and values and because not all assumptions and values are true or useful, approaches
to critical thinking must be carefully examined by those who would employ them. Latter-day Saint counselors and
psychotherapists should evaluate the kinds of critical thinking they use in their practice and consider supporting an
approach that is based on the truths of the restored gospel.

A

t a professional conference attended by one of the
authors of this article, a BYU faculty member made
a presentation regarding critical thinking. Afterward, one
attendee expressed her surprise that someone from BYU
would openly discuss critical thinking in a scholarly forum. Her prior experience in a graduate program at a
state university in Utah had evidently led her to believe
that faith in the doctrine and message of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) could only be
taken seriously by those with little motivation to think
critically about the nature of human existence and the
surrounding world.
This conference goer’s view of LDS church members
is thought provoking and challenging. It is conceivable
that many LDS church members fail to think deeply and
critically about important issues in their personal, profes-

sional, or spiritual lives, even though leaders (e.g., Brown,
1996; Faust, 1997; Hafen, 1996; Schultz, 2002) and scholars (e.g., Nibley, 1970; Warner, 1971) in the church have
explicitly warned against such a stance. Or perhaps this
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conference-goer had mistakenly assumed that it is impossible to exercise adequate critical and rational thought as a
religious person. If the latter is the case, then this person’s
statement would seem to represent a false dichotomy familiar to many and conceptualized by Warner (1971) as
“unthinking belief ” versus “faithless reason” (p. 14).
However one attempts to explain this conference-goer’s impression, it is likely that most LDS church members would reject the idea that because of their faith
they do not support and are unlikely to engage in deep
thought, serious questioning, and critical reflection,1
and many would have reservations about the traditional
faith-reason antinomy that underlies this notion. Surely
there must be some alternative position that better captures the activities of questioning and critical thinking
among faithful LDS church members, particularly psychotherapists. Although the precise nature of that position cannot be legislated in specific and dogmatic terms,
discussion of what it might generally entail seems useful.
If some conception of critical thinking can facilitate psychotherapeutic work and be edifying to faithful counselors and clients, it would be an important ally indeed.
What would a defensible and edifying approach to
critical thinking about psychotherapy look like? Would it
differ from what is commonly accepted in secular scholarly disciplines and practice? Should it? We will respond
to these questions by examining critical thinking as it is
conceptualized in the contemporary scholarly literatures
and by explaining why our answer to the second question is both yes and no. More specifically, we will briefly
review the main currents of thought regarding critical
thinking theory and practice, discuss some of their limitations, and suggest a more suitable starting point for a
defensible and edifying view of critical thinking for counselors and psychotherapists.

phies, such as those offered by Vico, Herder, Marx,
Kierkegaard, and James.2 This outpouring of scholarly
endeavor throughout the ages—which often entailed
vigorous attacks and defenses of various positions on
theology, ethics, reality, knowledge, human nature, governance, and education—provided a rich tradition of
critical analysis, even if the term critical thinking was not
yet in wide use and no formal “critical thinking across
the curriculum” programs were established.
The twentieth century saw not only continued intellectual debate but also rising concern with formalized
or institutional critical thinking practices, particularly
in pragmatist thinkers (e.g., Bode, 1921; Dewey, 1910,
1916), who emphasized reflective, logical thought developed through problem solving in real-world contexts, and
in the work of analytic philosophers (e.g., Black, 1946;
Copi, 1953), who emphasized formal logic and scientific
reasoning in the evaluation of arguments. It was not until
the last several decades of the twentieth century, however,
that critical thinking as a formal educational objective
received its fullest expression and was given its greatest
impetus by theorists and educators associated with the
informal logic movement.3 For these theorists, the most
defensible and serviceable form of critical thinking would
not be principally concerned with formal logic but with
“critical analysis of arguments as they occur in natural
language in the real marketplace of persuasion on controversial issues in politics, law, science, and all aspects
of daily life” (Walton, 1989, p. ix). According to informal logic advocates, critical thinking should emphasize
concerns such as adequacy of definitions, reduction of
ambiguity, examination of assumptions, validity of evidence, trustworthiness of statements by authorities, and
identification of a number of informal fallacies.
Within the contemporary mainstream behavioral sciences, theorists and researchers have joined informal logic with a strong thrust toward natural science rationality.
This combination has resulted in a form of critical thinking largely equated with careful use of methodological
procedures and scientific rules of evidence (e.g., Meltzoff,
1998; Ruscio, 2006; Stanovich, 2004)—an approach
sometimes referred to as “scientific-analytic reasoning”
(Dick, 1991, p. 84; Slife, Yanchar, & Reber, 2005). The
primary targets of critical analysis from this perspective
are theoretical claims and research results; only those
that meet particular scientific and logical criteria can be
considered authentic knowledge.

Traditional Approaches to Critical Thinking

Critical thinking in the Western tradition can be
traced to the philosophical dialogues of antiquity and
seen in subsequent eras of Western intellectual history,
as manifest in the works of formative thinkers such as
Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon, and Erasmus; in British empiricists such as
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume; in continental rationalists
such as Descartes and Kant; and in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century reactions to traditional philoso70
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Although theorists within the informal logic movement have agreed on many general issues—for example,
that critical thinking is necessary for adequate education
in a democracy, that a disposition to think critically must
accompany reasoning skills, and that such skills should
be generalizable to a variety of domains and contexts—
their work has not coalesced into a monolithic viewpoint
or set of practices. Indeed, notwithstanding the general acceptance of the informal logic approach to critical
thinking in secondary and post-secondary education,
diverse critical thinking definitions and strategies can
be found in the literatures of various scholarly fields, as
observers have noted (e.g., Beyer, 1987; Geersten, 2003;
Johnson, 1992; Pithers, 2000).
Consistent with this pattern, prominent theorists associated with the informal logic movement have disagreed
on basic issues and advanced a number of positions on
how critical thinking should be defined and practiced.
For instance, although Richard Paul and Harvey Siegel—two major theorists in the contemporary critical
thinking movement—share an underlying commitment
to liberal individualism and the development of the autonomous reasoner (cf. Weinstein, 1993; Thayer-Bacon,
2000), they differ substantially on how to conceptualize
and prioritize the tasks of critical analysis. To consider
just one point of disagreement, Paul has argued that
“background logics” (1992, p. 64) and “world views” (p.
467) are vitally important to any position or argument
and thus should be carefully considered by critical thinkers, whereas Siegel (1988) has contended that such an
emphasis ushers in a “vicious form of relativism” that
cannot give rise to meaningful, useful critical thinking
practices (p. 14).
Another brief example concerns the contrasting views
of Matthew Lipman and Robert Ennis—also prominent
theorists in the informal logic movement. In particular,
Lipman (1998) has argued that Ennis’s approach to critical thinking overemphasizes outcomes and offers defining
characteristics that are too vague to be useful; Lipman’s
own conception, of course, aims to remedy these problems. These and other4 examples of disagreement among
prominent theorists suggest that as ubiquitous as the informal logic approach to critical thinking may have become, no settled position on the meaning of critical thinking and its accompanying practices has emerged, nor has
continued debate and scholarship in this area suggested
that univocality is likely to be forthcoming.

Parallel debates are evident in applied psychology. For
example, the ongoing debate about empirically supported
treatments and evidence-based practice highlights disagreements about what constitutes evidence of effective
treatment. The disagreements among these psychologists
are similar to the disagreements among critical thinking theorists (see Kazdin, 2008). Like critical thinking
theorists, psychologists struggle to find models of critical thinking that are consistent with their scientific and
clinical perspectives on human nature.
Alternative Views of Critical Thinking

Although informal logic theorists have propelled critical thinking to its contemporary status, other approaches that offer substantially different conceptualizations
of critical analysis have been advanced. Stemming primarily from postmodern and critical theory literatures,
these alternatives provide unique, if somewhat less visible, critical thinking practices that present even greater
theoretical diversity.
Perhaps most notably, programs based on the thinking
of critical theorists such as Jurgen Habermas and Paulo
Freire—programs such as emancipatory education (e.g.,
Hart, 1985), critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1988; McLaren, 2003), and transformational learning (e.g., Mezirow,
1994)—have been increasingly influential in many domains but particularly in secondary, post-secondary, and
adult education. These approaches are heavily concerned
with the identification and examination of social institutions, prevailing practices, and hidden assumptions—including those associated with traditional Western science
and education—whose influences are thought to oppress
large segments of the population, and with the attainment
of new perspectives on self, community, and society that enable people to gain more autonomy and control. In essence,
advocates of this position seek to promote conscientization
(McLaren, 2003, p. 251)—to “raise the consciousness” (Fay,
1975, p. 103) of the oppressed and offer a means of “empowerment” (Giroux, 1997, p. 132). While this movement
is evident in some areas of applied psychology—such as
the social justice movement—it has yet to make much of
an impact on either mainstream theories or practice.
Other theorists (Brookfield, 1997; McPeck, 1981) have
questioned both the informal and formal logic approaches to critical thinking on the grounds that there are no
generic critical thinking skills to be applied across con71

volume 34

issues in religion and psychotherapy

texts and domains. This contextualist position holds that
because different disciplines or areas of inquiry involve
different logics, forms of reasoning, methods, purposes,
and standards for argumentation and validity, critical
thinking must be sensitive to the specific dynamics of
the topic and discipline, and such sensitivity would entail more than the routine application of rules to specific
situations. For contextualist theorists, an ability to think
critically must develop from a solid knowledge of a given
discipline and topic and then be supplemented with productive activities, such as analyzing assumptions, examining and creatively constructing alternatives to a given
idea or set of ideas, and solving problems in the process
of discovery—all of which would be informed by discipline-specific procedures and forms of reasoning.
Still others have called for unique forms of critical analysis that differ not only from the traditional approaches
described above but also from one another in their basic
characteristics and practices. For instance, various feminist theorists (e.g., Commeyras, 1994; Warren, 1994) have
argued that dominant patriarchal meaning systems and
frameworks must be challenged and that any view of critical thinking informed by patriarchal traditions—even
those of critical theory (Kohli, 1995)—cannot be used
in this work; interpretive theorists (e.g., Burbules, 1995;
Hostetler, 1994) have emphasized the value of dialogue
and the “clash of divergent views” (Hostetler, 1994, p. 143)
that moves people toward shared understandings and
deeper appreciations of diverse perspectives on the way to
a relatively stable (but critically reflexive) position of one’s
own; and neo-pragmatists (e.g., Tanner, 1988) have contended, in a Deweyian vein, that critical thinking should
begin with contextually situated problems that matter to
people and are solved through a type of scientifically oriented, reflective thought. These and other nontraditional
conceptions of critical thinking too numerous to catalog
here demonstrate the variety of positions that can be taken when engaging in critical analysis. Again, while these
schools of thought are often discussed in the training of
professional psychologists, they have yet to make much of
an impact on the general practice of psychology.

critical thinking in the space provided here. However,
notwithstanding their diversity we can consider them
collectively and point to three primary reasons why critical thinking strategies should not be taken uncritically to
be epistemologically neutral vehicles to valid knowledge
and progress.
One important limitation of many contemporary
critical thinking approaches concerns their emphasis
on the systematic application of predetermined rules
and standards in the evaluation of ideas, arguments, and
evidence.5 Although there surely must be some rules of
practice and evidence to accompany disciplined inquiry—that is, there must be some sense of what counts as
valid argumentation and evidence—the rigid use of such
rules amounts to little more than an automatic procedure—what one observer termed the “knee jerk application of various skills” (McPeck, 1981, p. 49). Moreover,
some theorists have argued that the rule-following approach cannot be viewed as a sufficient form of critical
inquiry because it provides no check on its own biases
and consequences for numerous social, moral, and theoretical issues (Walters, 1994; McPeck, 1981; Slife et al.,
2005). While rule following may usefully protect against
the misuse of certain methods, logic, evidence, and argumentation in a formal sense, it fails to take into consideration the fact that the rules themselves must be based
on some background assumptions regarding the nature
of logic, evidence, and argumentation and that those
assumptions and values—as well as the rules they invoke—must be examined for their suitability and helpfulness in particular situations.
A second limitation of prominent critical thinking
approaches is that they often hinder scholarship and
progress in ways not typically recognized. As one author summarized:
Critical thinking neglects or downplays emotions . . . privileges rational, linear, deductive thought over intuition . . .
is aggressive and confrontational rather than collegial and
collaborative . . . is individualistic and privileges personal
autonomy over the sense of community and relationship
. . . deals in abstraction and downplays lived experience
and concrete particularity . . . [and] presupposes the possibility of objectivity and thus does not recognize one’s
situatedness. (Balin, 1995, pp. 191–192)

Limitations of Critical Thinking in
the Scholarly Disciplines

Such criticisms are common in the dialogue between scientists and practitioners in professional psychology.

We cannot provide a detailed examination of the
nature and limitations of these various approaches to
72
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Other authors have expressed related concerns about
dominant approaches to critical thinking associated
with the formal and informal logic movements, arguing
that they do not adequately address power imbalances
(Giroux, 1994); that they are culture and gender biased
(Norris, 1995); that they should be based on explicitly
ethical positions but rarely are (Sears & Parsons, 1991);
that they offer abstract intellectual exercises and cannot
adequately deal with the complexity, ambiguity, and moral
tenor of real-world contexts (Martin, 1992); and that they
ignore important elements of constructive thinking, such
as care, creativity, and imagination (Thayer-Bacon, 1993;
McPeck, 1981; Walters, 1994). Again, such complaints are
often made by clinicians in voicing their dissatisfaction
with the scientific dimension of professional psychology.
Controversy surrounding the meaning and practice of
critical thinking is thus made more complex by such debate and by the fluid nature of critical thinking across
time, disciplines, and discourse communities. Increased
concern with these fundamental issues suggests that
there is much to consider as one embarks upon critical
analysis and that no patent, unreflective reliance on any
form of critical thinking—especially those that involve
a formulaic, rule-following strategy—are to be recommended. Ultimately, the kind of critical thinking used in
a given situation should fit coherently with one’s values,
purposes, and field of endeavor.
A third important limitation of critical thinking approaches concerns the seemingly inescapable axiom that
any critical thinking strategy will be informed by a theoretical background of assumptions and values regarding
what actually exists, how it can be known, what rules of
evidence are acceptable for studying it, and what valid
arguments are made about it. Understood this way, any
approach to critical thinking is best viewed as a theory
about quality argumentation, evidence, and reasoning
rather than as a neutral path to knowledge and progress. Although many have acknowledged the assumptive
and value-laden nature of critical thinking (e.g., Giroux, 1994; Martin, 1992; McPeck, 1981; Norris, 1992;
Sears & Parsons, 1991), one author captured the essence
of this point when she concluded that a person “cannot
think critically about everything at once: some things
must be assumed so that others can be scrutinized critically” (Martin, 1992, p. 176).
An important implication of this point regarding the
theoretical nature of critical thinking is that different

background assumptions and values will often lead to
differences not only in the conclusions drawn but also in
the modus operandi of critical thinking, including what
is emphasized, what kinds of knowledge claims and beliefs are ruled out by definition, and what kinds of arguments are viewed as plausible. That critical thinking
operates this way should not be surprising; if all critical
perspectives are based on assumptions and values, and if
those assumptions and values differ from one approach
to another, then different critical thinking perspectives will lead in different directions. Although a type
of question-begging will have taken place through this
process—where one’s presuppositions, in a sense, predetermine one’s critical assessments—scholars must enter
the discussion about critical thinking with at least some
vague pre-understanding and purposes already in place
if they are to take a stand at all.6 This means that any
critical thinking approach—as a theory about quality argumentation, evidence, and reasoning—will act as a set
of blinders that enables particular kinds of criticisms. It
should be obvious that this line of thinking has significant implications for counselors and psychotherapists.
As we become more aware of the value-laden nature of
psychotherapy, the importance of understanding one’s
philosophical grounding and inherent biases becomes
even more evident (Gadamer, 2005).
As an example, scientific analytic reasoning, which
was not formulated to address the dynamics of social
and institutional systems, is not in a position to promote
consciousness-raising, just as emancipatory education,
which was not designed to assess methodological details,
is not particularly useful for determining whether empirical studies were executed according to accepted scientific standards. The differences between these two types
of critical thinking become most apparent when they are
brought into dialogue: Advocates of emancipatory approaches have viewed scientific analytic reasoning as a
problematic institutional force that dominates much of
life in Western society (e.g., Fay, 1975; Hart, 1985; Freire,
1970; Prilleltensky, 1997); advocates of scientific analytic
reasoning see the claims of emancipatory theorists as in
need of scientific-analytic support to be persuasive (e.g.,
Ramm, 1998; Kendler, 1994). Similar value clashes are
becoming more apparent in applied psychology.
People of faith have long faced the value clashes inherent in various approaches to critical thinking. Consider
an example regarding perceptions of the veracity of LDS
73

volume 34

issues in religion and psychotherapy

scripture. Novak (1990) pointed out that some critical
perspectives based on naturalistic assumptions lead to the
categorical rejection of many of the claims of the prophet
Joseph Smith, including his account of the divine origin
of the Book of Mormon. From this naturalistic perspective—where only publicly demonstrable and replicable
regularities of nature count as admissible evidence—
earthly visitations by God or angels are not possible in
principle. While such an approach to critical thinking
is surely widespread in the scholarly fields, the bases on
which it is premised are not indubitable truisms—the
ultimate and irrefutable reality of the situation—but fallible claims about the nature of the world itself and the
methods of critical analysis derived from them.

motes human well-being, and spreads the gospel of Jesus
Christall motivated by love, concern, and respect.
A detailed explication of critical thinking from this
perspective is beyond the scope and limitations of this article, and its authors do not consider themselves qualified
to make prescriptions for all LDS mental health professionals. However, we can briefly describe one approach to
critical thinking from this perspective that is potentially
both defensible and edifying.
Given the generally accepted notion that all research,
theorizing, and practice will be informed by underlying
assumptions and values (as described above), we propose
that a view of critical thinking grounded in the restored
gospel should be concerned primarily with identifying and evaluating these assumptions and values along
with their implications for knowledge and practice. If
assumptions and values are logically prior in that they
shape the nature, direction, and consequences of psychotherapeutic and scholarly work of all sorts—including
use of methods, construction of theories, and development of practical applications—then they should receive
primary consideration. In this application the revealed
truth can provide a comparative basis for evaluating
the veracity and utility of various assumptions and values that inform research and theorizing in the scholarly
disciplines.7 As former BYU President Merrill Bateman
(1996) counseled, “We will be more productive and enjoy more freedom if we examine and test secular assumptions under the lamp of gospel truth” (p. 255).
Although this form of critical thinking is designed
to help LDS scholars and students evaluate what they
find in the marketplace of ideas, it can also facilitate
research and theorizing that endeavor to extend basic
truths of the restored gospel in scholarly and practical
ways. For example, researchers wishing to better understand human learning could—and from our perspective,
should—begin by considering the assumptions that will
inform their project. Through careful, critical analysis,
these researchers might draw guiding assumptions from
what is available in the existing disciplinary literatures,
or alternatively they may develop other conceptions to
ground their work; in either case, their purpose would be
to identify an assumptive starting point for their theory
and research that is reasonably consistent with basic tenets of the restored gospel.
An example of this kind of analysis was recently conducted by Joseph Ostenson (2008), a graduate student at

Toward an Edifying View of Critical Thinking

Because all critical thinking strategies will be framed by
a theoretical background of assumptions and values, and
because not all assumptions and values are true or useful,
approaches to critical thinking must be carefully examined by those who would employ them. Challenging conceptual questions must be answered by those who wish to
engage in thoughtful, reflective, critical analysis and dialogue. What assumptive starting point is most helpful for
critical examinations in a given area? Do the assumptions
and values that currently dominate the scholarly fields
provide the most useful and appropriate resources for
critical analysis? Answers to these questions are important because they will inform both the nature and direction of critical thought, and, of course, faulty assumptions
will lead in unfruitful or problematic directions.
Like anyone else in the profession, LDS counselors
and psychotherapists must carefully consider the kinds
of critical thinking that will inform their science and
practice. While many critical thinking positions are described in the scholarly literatures, LDS counselors and
psychotherapists may wish to take seriously an approach
based on the truths and values brought forth by the restored gospel. If the ultimate purpose of critical thinking
for LDS scholars and students is unfolding and revealing
truth, then the surest foundation for this work is to begin
in gospel-centered principles and standards. Such an approach would manifest and clarify the scope and power
of the doctrines of the restored gospel. Furthermore,
critical thinking grounded in truth would likely lead to
edification—which extends human understanding, pro74
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BYU. His research, an axiological analysis of the assumptions inherent in a popular theory and approach to couples therapy (Gottman, 1999)—an approach advocated
and used by many LDS psychotherapists—revealed hedonism and individuality to be primary underlying values in the theory. Of course, many LDS psychotherapists
would be disturbed to realize that they might be using a
system with inherent values such as these.
Critical thinking that is rooted in gospel-compatible
sources of truth and takes spiritual and religious matters seriously would seem to have a distinct advantage
over more worldly counterparts that ignore the truth of
such matters. Such thinking would begin not with stark
uncertainty, skepticism, or fallible and restrictive methodologies but with inspired historical accounts and revelations that, as President Kimball (1996) observed,“contain the master concepts for mankind” (p. 73) and that
can, as Welch and Norton (1996) briefly noted, “provide
axioms from which reason can derive useful and insightful implications” (p. vii). Moreover, it would seem that
continued reliance on the Holy Ghost can provide believing scholars and students with divine insight as they
engage in the critical examination of assumptions and
values of all sorts.
We are not aware of any church leaders who have explicitly addressed critical thinking as practiced in the contemporary academic arena, but some have raised the possibility of framing academic and scholarly work in the manner
we have described. One overriding message seems to be
that the restored gospel of Jesus Christ provides more than
a set of religious observances; it provides a perspective on
human existence and knowledge that can be deployed in
scholarly projects and critiques. Thus LDS scholars and
psychotherapists have been counseled that in their work
they “must not merely ‘ape the world’” (Kimball, 1996, p.
66) and that “if we limit ourselves to the wisdom of men,
we will end up like the Nephites, who, boasting in their
own strength, were destroyed because they were ‘left in
their own strength (Hel. 4:13)’” (Oaks, 1976, p. 127). A
bit more directly, in his Second Century Address to BYU,
President Kimball (1996) stated:

These quotations suggest that there is a precedent for
not taking restored truths lightly in our academic or clinical work, including the work of critical thinking, and that
an edifying conception of critical thinking based on the
perspective of the restored gospel is not an outlandish idea.
As with any form of careful examination and evaluation,
an approach to critical thinking grounded in the restored
truth brings with it certain responsibilities. One responsibility of those who adopt this approach is to know the field
well. To perform the kind of critical analysis we recommend, psychotherapists and scholars must have intimate
awareness and understanding of disciplinary theories and
methods at their deepest levels, including the best practices, the knowledge bases, and the underlying philosophies
in an area of research and practice. Nibley’s (1978) warning about zeal without knowledge, as well as warnings by
BYU presidents Rex E. Lee (1996) and Dallin H. Oaks
(1976), seem particularly relevant here. In essence, LDS
professionals must understand the scholarly disciplines
well in order to make contributions to them—through
critical analysis or otherwise—and to receive revelation
that will further those fields. It should always be kept in
mind that one who seeks to conduct a profoundly critical
analysis of a field has the need and the responsibility to
have a profound understanding of the field. The knowledge of an earnest critic must equal or exceed that of an
adherent or practitioner.
A second responsibility of those who employ this approach to critical thinking is critical self-examination
coupled with humility. From the perspective we advocate,
which holds that the results of a critical examination will
reflect assumptions and values that inform the critical inquiry process, it is crucial to reflect on one’s own assumptions and values over time. Whether the assumptions
and values that guide critical thought take scholars and
students in truthful and valuable directions is a question
of continual importance. For critical inquirers to be willing to engage in this continued self-examination, however, they must cultivate a sense of humility about their
own assumptive frameworks, abilities, and projects. Even
when researchers or practitioners base their work on a
set of beliefs that seem consistent with principles of the
restored gospel, they must be open to the possibility that
their understandings and uses of these beliefs are incomplete and imperfect such that they will not effectively
advance critical inquiry, scholarship, or the work of the
church. For instance, researchers may champion human

We must be willing to break with the educational establishment (not foolishly or cavalierly, but thoughtfully
and for good reason) in order to find gospel ways to help
mankind. Gospel methodology, concepts, and insights
can help us to do what the world cannot do in its own
frame of reference. (p. 72)
75
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agency in theories of development and personality or in
their clinical work, but some views of agency are likely
to be more helpful than others. Discussions of this issue
over the years by Bergin (1975), Hook (1958), Howard
(1994), Rychlak (1988), Sappington (1990), Williams
(1992), and others reflect the diversity and complexity
of thought around this one issue. Though all LDS psychotherapists would likely espouse the notion of human
or moral agency, how many would have the breadth and
depth of knowledge in the area to critically analyze the
construct and their use of it in scholarship or practice?
Indeed, the limits of human understanding strongly
suggest that researchers must be willing to revise assumptions and knowledge claims as further experience
(of all sorts) may invite. Perhaps no one said this more
clearly than Hugh B. Brown (1996):

tion of important findings and analyses in the languages
of the scholarly disciplines, presented to those scholars
who would find them especially relevant. If insights from
LDS doctrine and revelation—particularly as developed
through research programs—can help inform theory
and practice, then they should be presented persuasively
and helpfully to those already practicing in the world.
Indeed, many years ago Elder Neal A. Maxwell (1976)
admonished LDS behavioral scientists to do just this
(cf. Bergin, 1979; Williams, 1998). Thus the critical examinations that we recommend, as well as the innovative theory and research that spring from them, could be
brought to the world in scholarly ways.
In summary, with careful academic preparation in
worldly counseling approaches and a deep understanding of the gospel, LDS counselors can develop their
professional knowledge based on truthful assumptions,
employ their knowledge with humility, and communicate their findings to other mental health professionals in
the world. Several implications for clinical practice arise
when critical thinking is based upon a gospel foundation.
First, a counselor who makes his or her values explicit
becomes a better counselor. A thoughtful analysis of how
to work with values in counseling appears in Richards
and Bergin (2005, pp. 166–171; 193–199). These authors discuss the ethical concerns with value imposition
in therapy and make suggestions for how therapists can
acknowledge values but refrain from coercing or subtly
influencing clients to adopt their own position. This
work, along with that of others outside the LDS faith
(e.g., Tjeltveit, 1986), is exploring and should continue to
explore and refine such issues. Additionally, a counselor
who knows his or her values is not only more sensitive to
and thoughtful about working with values in therapy but
is more attuned to his or her own counter transference.
Knowing one’s own values well makes a counselor more
able to acknowledge when those values are interfering
with treatment and more apt to seek supervision, consultation, further education, or referral to another provider.
Another clinical benefit of using a critical thinking approach based on the restored gospel is increased ability
for therapists to access healing resources in and out of
therapy. Richards and Bergin (2005) detail many of the
ways therapists who believe in God’s power and influence
can benefit from accessing such power with clients. For
example, ethically informed therapists can rely on personal private prayer and on the inspiration of the Holy

We have been blessed with much knowledge by revelation from God which, in some part, the world lacks. But
there is an incomprehensibly greater part of truth which
we must yet discover. Our revealed truth should leave us
stricken with the knowledge of how little we really know.
It should never lead to an emotional arrogance based
upon a false assumption that we somehow have all the
answers—that we in fact have a corner on truth, for we
do not. (p. 86)

Although some beliefs would seem to be non-negotiable for LDS scholars and students, such as those pertaining to the existence of an embodied God, the reality of
apostolic authority, redemption through Christ’s atonement, and the historical truthfulness of the events of the
restoration,8 there is much more to be learned by God’s
children—within and without the church—and much
more that could inform edifying conceptions of critical
thinking and the growth of knowledge. Thus while LDS
scholars and students can resist “false fashions in education” (Kimball, 1996, p. 65) by privileging “those basic
principles which have proved true and right and have
guided good men and women and good universities over
the centuries,” (p. 77), they need not uncritically reject the
whole of secular scholarship, just as they need not uncritically accept it. As Elder Oaks (1976) noted,“The learning
of men, when it is true, is inspired of God” (p. 126). Sifting helpful assumptions, arguments, and findings from
those of less worth, of course, is a major function of the
approach to critical thinking that we advocate.
A third responsibility of those who employ this approach to critical thinking is concerned with the articula76
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Ghost before and during client sessions. They can sensitively encourage clients to rely on prayer, scripture, worship, spiritual community, and personal revelation (see
Richards & Bergin, 2005, pp. 251–279). How therapists
access the healing power of the restored gospel and how
they help their clients do so can be further defined and
explored with benefits to client and therapist alike.
A clinical implication of a gospel-based approach is
its emphasis on counselors becoming scientist-practitioners. Such an approach allows therapists, who are working within appropriate ethical boundaries, to experiment
with gospel-based principles and their application in
therapy both on an individual, case-by-case basis and
in clinical research. Returning to the example of agency,
therapists with an understanding of different conceptualizations of agency can experiment with which of these
will bear the most fruit in clinical treatment. An LDS
therapist would not discount or undervalue agency, given
his or her religious beliefs, but would be attuned to the
importance of this principle in clinical work. For example, he or she would be aware of when use of a secular
theory allows a therapist to inadvertently misuse his or
her authority to further limit a client’s agency. In the example of agency, reliance on an important principle of
the gospel that is defining for human purpose is central
to an LDS counselor’s critical thinking about psychotherapy approaches and might even lead to insights that
could be shared with those outside the LDS faith.
In their personal explorations with clients and in consultation with other LDS counselors and psychotherapists, LDS therapists can positively influence therapists
outside the LDS faith. For example, Richards and Bergin (2005) have sought to create a place in mainstream
psychotherapy for a spiritual approach to counseling
that may create a possible framework for an LDS-specific counseling approach as well as particular spiritual
approaches for other denominations. Their approach
begins with philosophical and theistic assumptions
about human nature, personality, and purpose that are
aligned with truths and principles of the gospel of Jesus
Christ. These therapists ground their work on gospelbased truths and bring their awareness in a helpful way
to counselors of other denominations and to secular
practitioners. There are many creative, thoughtful LDS
practitioners who, with careful preparation in the gospel
and an understanding of secular approaches, could bring
new ideas and tools to secular mental health treatment

or even to mental health approaches from other religious
denominations.
These clinical implications just scratch the surface of
what might arise from application of a critical thinking
approach grounded on an LDS foundation.
Conclusion

The view of critical thinking we have described would
lead to distinct kinds of examinations and conclusions—
for example, those that assume a priori the truth of the
restored gospel and that analyze other ideas and assumptions, either secular or spiritual, in light of what has been
revealed. From a logical standpoint, such an approach
begs the question of truth by presupposing the nature
of what it will examine (i.e., what is true or false about it,
what can be known about it); but as suggested above, this
type of question-begging is inescapable in the processes
of any critical, systematic inquiry and thus will inhere
in all attempts at critical thought. Inquirers must begin
their critical examination somewhere, based on some
perspective that will raise certain questions and obviate
others; without such a perspective, there would be no basis for the formulation of questions or critiques in the
first place. As Elder Maxwell (1976) suggested, “A commitment to truth requires the rejection of some things as
well as the acceptance of others” (p. 594). It should not
be surprising or problematic, then, that critical inquirers
would seek a trustworthy starting point for their line of
questioning. For many LDS church members, this starting point could be faith in Jesus Christ and his restored
gospel, as well as continuing revelation. The critical
thinking that ensues, then, could replace formulaic rulefollowing, reactive fault-finding, and limited rationalities
with a searching examination of ideas, arguments, and
evidence, performed to edify the human family, based on
the surest foundation possible.
References
Balin, S. (1995). Is critical thinking biased? Clarifications and implications. Educational Theory, 45, 191–192.
Bateman, M. J. (1996). Learning in Zion: Two addresses. In J. W.
Welch & D. E. Norton (Eds.), Educating Zion. Provo, UT: BYU
Studies Press.
Bergin, A. E. (1975). Toward a theory of human agency. BYU Studies,
16, 165–183.

77

volume 34

issues in religion and psychotherapy

uum.

Bergin, A. E. (1979). Bringing the restoration to the academic world:
Clinical psychology as a test case. BYU Studies, 19, 449–473.

Geersten, H. R. (2003). Rethinking thinking about higher-level
education. Teaching Sociology, 31, 1–19.

Beyer, B. K. (1987). Practical strategies for the teaching of thinking. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Giroux, H. A. (1988). Teachers as intellectuals: Toward a critical pedagogy
of learning. Granby, MA: Bergin & Garvey.

Black, M. (1946). Critical thinking: An introduction to logic and scientific
method. New York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
Blair, J. A., & Johnson, R. H. (Eds.). (1980). Informal logic: The first
international symposium. Inverness, CA: Edgepress.

Giroux, H. (1994). Toward a pedagogy of critical thinking. In K. S.
Walters (Ed.), Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Bode, B. H. (1921). Fundamentals of education. New York, NY: The
MacMillan Company.

Giroux, H. A. (1997). Pedagogy and the politics of hope: Theory, culture,
and schooling. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Brookfield, S. (1997). Assessing critical thinking. New Directions for
Adult and Continuing Education, 75, 17–29.

Gottman, J. M. (1999). The marriage clinic: A scientifically based marital
therapy. New York, NY: WW Norton & Company.

Brookfield, Developing critical thinkers: Challenging adults to explore alternative ways of thinking and acting

Guba, E. G. (1990). The paradigm dialog. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications.

Brown, H. B. (1996). An eternal quest: Freedom of the mind. In J.
W. Welch & D. E. Norton (Eds.), Educating Zion (81–92). Provo, UT: BYU Studies Press.

Hafen, B. C. (1996). The dream is ours to fulfill. In J. W. Welch &
D. E. Norton (Eds.), Educating Zion. Provo, UT: BYU Studies
Press.

Burbules, N. C. (1995). Reasonable doubt: Toward a postmodern
defense of reason as an educational aim. In W. Kohli (Ed.), Critical conversations in philosophy of education. New York, NY: Routledge.

Hart, M. (1985). Thematization of power, the search for common
interests, and self-reflection: Towards a comprehensive concept
of emancipatory education. International Journal of Lifelong Education, 4, 119–134.

Burtt, E. A. (1954). The metaphysical foundations of modern science. Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor.

Hook, S. (Ed.). (1958). Determinism and freedom in the age of modern
science. New York, NY: Collier Books.

Commeyras, M. (1994). Exploring critical thinking from a feminist
standpoint: Limitations and potential. In C. Kinzer, D. Leu, & J.
Peter (Eds.), Multidimensional aspects of literacy research, theory, and
practice: Forty-third yearbook of the national reading conference. Chicago, IL: National Reading Conference, Inc.

Hostetler, K. (1994). Community and neutrality in critical thought:
A nonobjectivist view on the conduct and teaching of critical
thinking. In K. S. Walters (Ed.), Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Howard, G. (Ed.). (1994). Special topic: Free will and psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 14, PAGE
NUMBERS.

Copi, I. (1953). Introduction to logic. New York, NY: The MacMillan
Company.

Johnson, R. E. (1992). The problem of defining critical thinking. S. P.
Norris (Ed.). New York, NY: Teacher’s College Press.

Dewey, J. D. (1910). How we think. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
Dewey, J. D. (1916). Democracy and education. New York, NY: The
MacMillan Company.

Kazdin, A. E. (2008). Evidence-based treatment and practice: New
opportunities to bridge clinical research and practice, enhance
the knowledge base, and improve patient care. American Psychologist, 63(3), 146–159.

Dick, D. (1991). An empirical taxonomy of critical thinking. Journal
of Instructional Psychology, 18(2), 79–92.
Ennis, R. H. (1996). Critical thinking. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Kendler, H. H. (1994). Can psychology reveal the ultimate values of
humankind? American Psychologist, 49(11), 970–971.

Faust, J. E. (1997, November). Learning for eternity. Speech presented
at Brigham Young University, Provo, UT. Retrieved from http://
speeches.byu.edu/reader/reader.php?id=3003&x=56&y=6.

Kimball, S. W. (1996). Climbing the hills just ahead: Three addresses. In J. W. Welch & D. E. Norton (Eds.), Educating Zion. Provo,
UT: BYU Studies Press.

Fay, B. (1975). Social theory and political practice. London, England:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Kohli, W. (1995). Educating for emancipatory rationality. In W.
Kohli (Ed.), Critical conversations in philosophy of education. New
York, NY: Routledge.

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York, NY: Continuum.
Gadamer, H. G. (2005). Truth and method (2nd ed., revised; J. Weinsheimer & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). London, England: Contin-

Lee, R. E. (1996). By study and also by faith. In J. W. Welch & D. E.
Norton (Eds.), Educating Zion. Provo, UT: BYU Studies Press.

78

Critical Thinking in Applied Psychology

Jackson, Yanchar, Hansen, and Hansen

Prilleltensky, I. (1997). Values, assumptions, and practices: Assessing
the moral implications of psychological discourse and action.
American Psychologist, 52(5), 517–535.

Lipman, M. (1998). Critical thinking: What can it be? Educational
Leadership, 46, 38–43.
Lipman, M. (2003). Thinking in education (2nd ed.). New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.

Ramm, D. (1998). Consider the scientific study of morality. American Psychologist, 53(3), 323–324.

Marias, J. (1967). History of philosophy. New York, NY: Dover.

Richards, P. S. & Bergin, A. E. (2005). A spiritual strategy for counseling and psychotherapy. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Martin, J. R. (1992). Critical thinking for a humane world. In S. P.
Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple perspectives on an educational ideal. New York, NY: Teacher’s College
Press.

Robinson, D. N. (1986). An intellectual history of psychology. Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

Maxwell, N. A. (1976). Some thoughts on the gospel and the behavioral sciences. BYU Studies, 16, 589–602.

Ruscio, J. (2006). Critical thinking in psychology: Separating sense from
nonsense (2nd ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.

McLaren, P. (2003). Life in the schools (4th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn
& Bacon.

Rychlak, J. F. (1988). The psychology of rigorous humanism (2nd ed.).
New York, NY: New York University Press.

McPeck, J. E. (1981). Critical thinking and education. New York, NY:
St. Martin’s Press.

Sappington, A. (1990). Recent psychological approaches to the free
will versus determinism issue. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 19–29.

Meltzoff, J. (1998). Critical thinking about research. Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association Press.

Schultz, C. R. (2002). Faith obedience. Ensign, 32(May), 29–31.
Scriven, M. (1976). Reasoning. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.

Mezirow, J. (1994). Understanding transformation theory. Adult Education Quarterly, 44, 222–232.

Sears, A., & Parsons, J. (1991). Towards critical thinking as an ethic.
Theory and Research in Social Education, 19, 45–68.

Mezirow, J. (1998). On Critical Reflection. Adult Education Quarterly,
48(3), 185–198.

Siegel, H. (1988). Educating reason. New York, NY: Routledge.

Nibley, H. (1970). Educating the saints: A Brigham Young mosaic.
BYU Studies, 11, 61–87.

Slife, B. D., & Williams, R. N. (1995). What’s behind the research?
Discovering hidden assumptions in the behavioral sciences. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Nibley, H. (1978). Zeal without knowledge. Dialogue: A Journal of
Mormon Thought, 11, 101–112.

Slife, B. D., Yanchar, S. C., & Reber, J. S. (2005). Thinking critically
about critical thinking. In B. D. Slife, J. S. Reber, & F. C. Richardson (Eds.), Critical thinking in psychology. Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association Press.

Norris, S. P. (1992). Introduction: The generalizability question. In
S. P. Norris (Ed.), The generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple
perspectives on an educational ideal. New York, NY: Teacher’s College Press.

Stanovich, K. E. (2004). How to think straight about psychology (6th
ed.). Boston, MA: Pearson Allyn & Bacon.

Norris, S. P. (1995). Sustaining and responding to charges of bias in
critical thinking. Educational Theory, 45, 199–211.

Tanner, L. N. (1988). The path not taken: Dewey’s model of inquiry.
Curriculum Inquiry, 18, 471–479.

Novak, G. F. (1990). Naturalistic assumptions and the Book of
Mormon. BYU Studies, 30, 23–40.

Thayer-Bacon, B. (1993). Caring and its relationship to critical
thinking. Educational Theory, 43, 323–340.

Oaks, D. H. (1976, July). A house of faith. Speech presented at a
Brigham Young University Campus Forum, Provo, UT.

Thayer-Bacon, B. (2000). Transforming critical thinking: Thinking constructively. New York, NY: Teacher’s College Press.

Ostenson, J. A. (2008). The neglect of divorce in marital research: An ontological analysis of the work of John Gottman (Master’s thesis). Retrieved from http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/cdm4/item_viewer.
php?CISOROOT=/ETD&CISOPTR=1639&CISOBOX=
1&REC=2.

Tjeltveit, A. C. (1986). The ethics of value conversion in psychotherapy: Appropriate and inappropriate therapist influence on
client values. Clinical Psychology Review, 6, 515–537.
Walters, K. (1994). Critical thinking, rationality, and the vulcanization of students. In K. S. Walters (Ed.), Re-thinking reason: New
perspectives in critical thinking. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Paul, R. W. (1992). Critical thinking: What every person needs to survive
in a rapidly changing world. A. J. A. Binker (Ed.) Rohnert Park,
CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking.

Walton, D. N. (1989). Informal logic: A handbook for critical argumentation. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Pithers, R. T. (2000). Critical thinking in education: A review. Educational Research, 42, 237–249.

Warner, T. (1971, November). An open letter to students: On hav-

79

volume 34

issues in religion and psychotherapy

ing faith and thinking for yourself. New Era. Retrieved from
http://lds.org/new-era/1971/11/an-open-letter-to-studentson-having-faith-and-thinking-for-yourself?lang=eng.

scholarship in their work; moreover, a majority of the faculty
members in this survey supported the notion that students
should be taught to think critically about a variety of issues; for
details, see Wilson (1999).

Warren, K. J. (1994). Critical thinking and feminism. In K. S. Walters (Ed.), Re-thinking reason: New perspectives in critical thinking.
Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

2.	 For more on critical thinking in antiquity, see Thayer-Bacon
(2000). For more detailed treatments of Western intellectual
history, see Marias (1967) and Robinson (1986).

Weinstein, M. (1993). Critical thinking: The great debate. Educational Theory, 43, 99–117.
Welch, J. J., & Norton, D. E. (1996). Foreword. In J. W. Welch &
D. E. Norton (Eds.), Educating Zion. Provo, UT: BYU Studies
Press.

3.	 For a review of this movement, see Thayer-Bacon (2000). For
works by major theorists in this movement, see Blair and Johnson (1980), Ennis (1996), Lipman (2003), Paul (1992), Scriven
(1976), Seigel (1988), and Walton (1989).

Williams, R. N. (1992). The human context of agency. American Psychologist, 47(6), 752–760.

4.	 For more on the debates within contemporary critical thinking,
see Thayer-Bacon (2000) and Johnson (1992).

Williams, R. N. (1998). Restoration and the “turning of things upside down”: What is required of an LDS perspective. AMCAP
Journal, 23(1), 1–30.

5.	 Scientific analytic reasoning is probably the most visible rulefollowing approach, although there are others. For more on
this point, see Burbules (1995), McPeck (1981), and Walters
(1994).

Wilson, K. J. (1999). By study and also by faith: The faculty at
Brigham Young University responds. BYU Studies, 38, 157–175.

6.	 For more on the necessity of presuppositions, see Brookfield,
Burtt (1954), Guba (1990), Palmer (1969), Paul (1992), Sears
and Parsons (1991), and Slife and Williams (1995).

Yanchar, S. C., & Slife, B. D. (2004). Teaching critical thinking by
examining assumptions. Teaching of Psychology, 31, 85–90.

7.	 For more on assumption analysis as a form of critical thinking, see Mezirow (1998), Slife et al. (2005), Slife and Williams
(1995), and Yanchar and Slife (2004).

Endnotes

8.	 As Elder Hafen (1996) advised, LDS scholars and students
“cannot allow [their] most sacred premises to be altered or even
minimized by secularist assumptions” (p. 220).

1.	 For example, a 1998 survey of BYU faculty members suggested
that they overwhelmingly favored the integration of faith and
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